ABSTRACT: NASA performed testing to evaluate the efficacy of fire containment boxes without forced ventilation. Configurational flammability testing was performed on a simulation avionics box replicating critical design features and filled with materials possessing representative flammability characteristics. This paper discusses the box's ability, under simulated end-use conditions, to inhibit the propagation of combustion to surrounding materials. Analysis was also performed to evaluate the potential for the fire containment box to serve as an overheat/ignition source to temperature sensitive equipment (such as items with lithium-ion batteries). Unrealistically severe combustion scenarios were used as a means to better understand the fire containment mechanism. These scenarios were achieved by utilizing materials/fuels not typically used in space vehicles due to flammability concerns. Oxygen depletion, during combustion within the fire containment boxes, drove self-extinguishment and proved an effective method of fire containment.
Background
Flight avionics boxes are used with a wide range of applications throughout the International Space Station (ISS) cabin. Avionics boxes are an efficient means of containing required materials within an enclosure. Beyond the specific avionics box application, containment boxes may also be considered as a potential strategy for isolating possible flammable materials in general.
NASA performed testing to evaluate the efficacy of fire containment boxes without forced ventilation. Configurational flammability testing was performed on a simulation avionics box replicating critical design features and filled with materials possessing representative flammability characteristics. This paper discusses the box's ability, under simulated end-use conditions, to inhibit the propagation of combustion to surrounding materials. Analysis was also performed to evaluate the potential for the fire containment box to serve as an overheat/ignition source to temperature sensitive equipment (such as items with lithium-ion (Li-Ion) batteries) as well as to evaluate general flame propagation potential to nearby flammable materials.
Unrealistically severe combustion scenarios were used as a means to better understand the fire containment mechanism. These scenarios were achieved by utilizing materials/fuels not typically used in space vehicles due to flammability concerns.
Simulated Avionics Box Test Methodology
NASA White Sands Test Facility (WSTF) routinely performs NASA Standard 6001 Upward Propagation (Test 1) to qualify prospective materials, with respect to flammability, for final use on spacecraft. NASA Standard Test 1 evaluates a material's ability to self-extinguish a flame within a 6-in. vertical burn path for a given pressure and oxygen concentration [1] . Open flame ignition is initiated by the application of an electrical current to a helically formed bare 20 gauge nickel chromium wire wound around a chemical igniter, which in turn applies an open flame of known energy output to the sample for approximately 25 seconds. Radiant heat ignition utilizes the same electrical circuit but omits the NASA-STD-6001 igniter.
This upward propagation test methodology provided the perfect test bed for simulating a combustion event within an avionics box. Precise placement of an overwhelming ignition source provided control over which materials were ignited. Temperature measurements could be obtained at key locations to verify ignition of test materials and offer insight into the method of extinguishment as well as the overheat potential of the enclosure. Flammable poly methylmethacrylate (PMMA) witness plates were placed above the enclosure feed-through holes to evaluate the propensity of escaping flames to ignite nearby materials. All testing was performed within a 1.4 m 3 (50 ft 3 ) flammability chamber.
Scope of Testing
The objective of this test was to mimic a fire occurring in an avionics box in the projected conditions present on future spacecraft. Testing was performed to assess the potential for breach of enclosure (the avionics box) in the event of a fire within the enclosure, assuming normal operating conditions. Not only was the test article evaluated, but also the general containment approach was evaluated as a tool for inhibiting fire propagation both directly and as a potential overheat ignition source. All testing was performed in worst-case planned end use environmental Testing was divided into two portions: 1) realistic simulation of current ISS avionics box configuration, and 2) creation of unrealistically severe combustion events. Both scenarios utilized the same simulation enclosure.
Test Article
Instead of using an actual avionics box, a simplified model consisting of a welded 6016 aluminum box was constructed and used as the test article. All box design parameters were intended to emulate worst-case flammability conditions on current avionics box designs to ensure testing appropriately modeled worst-case heat transfer, flame escape, and propagation to adjacent material. To best represent end use configuration, the lid was bolted to the enclosure using a bolt spacing of less than 31.75 mm (1.25 in.). The model avionics box used a representative volume of 15.14 L (923.4 in 3 ). The base had a length and width of 24 by 24 cm (9 by 9 in.), with a height of 29 cm (11.4 in.). For current avionics box designs, the worst-case (thinnest cross-section) wall thickness is 0.38 cm (0.150 in.). This test used a conservative wall thickness of ~0.25 cm (0.1 in.). The thinner wall thickness allowed conservative modeling of surface temperatures. Surface temperature modeling was used to estimate the potential for heat generated within the box to serve as an ignition source to adjacent materials.
An important facet to testing was to assess any flames that could potentially escape the box and propagate to surrounding materials. Printed circuit board (PCB) internal pass-through connector slots and vents were identified as potential flame escape pathways and were included in the representative avionics box test model. Slots were cut into the lid of the avionics box to allow PCB internal pass-through connectors to protrude through the enclosure. To ensure the test was conservative, the pass-through connectors were not sealed, to allow respiration of the box due to pressure fluctuations caused by combustion. All tests were performed with the enclosure cover facing upward to promote combustion and exploit buoyancy in 1 g conditions by utilizing the PCB internal pass-through connector portholes. Flammable materials (PMMA) were placed above the box to evaluate whether any escaped flames could induce ignition and propagation.
Upward orientation was chosen as a worst-case condition with respect to flame escape scenarios.
A simplified vent fixture utilizing a "tortuous path" for venting gas was implemented to emulate flight conditions without overcomplicating fabrication or assembly. A vent assembly was located on the side of the box to model planned use configuration with machined windows similar to flight models. The avionics box test article is shown in Fig. 1 .
Three surface mount thermocouples acquired temperature data to assess the heat damage potential of a combustion event occurring within an avionics box. One thermocouple was located on the outside cover directly above the ignition source, and the other two thermocouples were located on the inner and outer surfaces of the vent fixture.
Realistic Simulation Test Parameters
Simulation testing entailed use of representative end-use materials (wiring, circuit boards, insulation material, etc.). Added severity was achieved by the use of materials known to be more flammable than anticipated flight materials.
Six rows of commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) Arathane ®1 -coated PCBs were bolted to the lid of the test box to mimic a flight array. Seven lengths of 20-strand 20-gauge polytetrafluoroethylene (PTFE) coated silver-clad copper wires were restrained within the avionics box by four silicone-clad stainless steel P-clamps located 2.5 cm (1 in.) apart to mimic planned spacing in future box designs. The PTFE wire bundle was woven through the PCBs to provide a propagation path. Six nylon zip ties held the wires together, spaced 5.1 cm (2 in.) apart on wires to serve as fuel within the enclosure (Fig. 2) . Nylon and PTFE are typical materials used in flight configuration and therefore represent a realistic scenario.
A 91 by 7.6 cm (36 by 3 in.) polyvinylchloride (PVC) ribbon cable was woven through the PCBs to create a realistic configuration and provide fuel within the enclosure. Per maximum oxygen concentration (MOC), use of the more flammable PVC is conservative over the polyimide material normally used in flight configurations (MOCPVC ~ 40%; MOCPolyimide ~ >99%) [2, 3] . Commercial off-the-shelf items that included mezzanine connectors were used for PVC cable. Figure 2 shows the final placement of materials attached to the interior of the enclosure. Components are labeled as follows: 1) vent fixture; 2) nylon tie wrap; 3) PTFE wire strands, and 4) P-clamps.
Finally, four 1.6 by 15.2 by 6.4 cm (0.625 by 6 by 2.5 in.) blocks of highly flammable polyurethane foam (MOC = 19%) [4] were placed between some of the PCBs to add conservatism to the test. Commercial off-the-shelf PCB internal pass-through connectors were 1 Arathane ® is a registered trademark of Ciba-Geigy Corporation, Tarrytown, New York.
used for testing (Fig. 3) . As a COTS item, PCB internal pass-through connectors were thought to be made of phthalate; however, chemical verification was not performed. The connectors were located on the lid of the enclosure without sealing, to allow for gas exchange. No fans were used inside the modeled avionics box. Current avionics box designs use heat exchangers for cooling.
Unrealistically Severe Test Parameters
The unrealistically severe scenario utilized the highly flammable polyurethane foam as a fuel and nothing more. The PCBs were stripped of the mounting surfaces, and copper mounting fixtures were used to attach the foam blocks to the avionics box (Fig. 5) . These blocks were mounted to 
Test Results
Ignition of materials within the simulation avionics box was verified prior to the performance of any in-depth posttest analysis. Table 1 
Conclusions
Configurational flammability testing performed on a simulation avionics box yielded results unique to this type of assembly that may also be considered as a potential strategy for isolating other possible flammable materials and components in spacecraft vehicles. Analysis was performed to evaluate the potential for the fire containment box to serve as an overheat/ignition source to temperature sensitive equipment (such as items with Li-Ion batteries) as well as the ability of escaping flames to propagate to nearby materials. Unrealistically severe combustion scenarios were also used as a means to better understand the fire containment mechanism.
Oxygen depletion, during combustion within the fire containment boxes, drove self-extinguishment and proved an effective method of fire containment.
In all test scenarios, realistic as well as unrealistically severe polyurethane foam testing, selfextinguishment of materials was observed. As polyurethane is known to be highly flammable at the 40 percent oxygen and 101.3 kPa (14.7 psia) test conditions [4] , it is particularly noteworthy that in all tests polyurethane at some point ignited and self-extinguished. Premixed gas was supplied to the test chamber after pulling vacuum, guaranteeing the interior of the box had fully mixed 40 percent oxygen available at the initiation of the test. It is believed that, in all cases, self-extinguishment is due to oxygen depletion occurring inside the avionics box as a result of combustion. Though the simulation avionics box was not hermetically sealed and various known leak paths existed, it was shown that positive pressure due to gas expansion and combustion products inhibits fresh oxygen from replenishing the constrained volume until self-extinguishment occurs.
Although smoke was observed exiting the avionics box from around the PCB internal pass-through connector interfaces, no flames were observed; therefore, no direct propagation risks to nearby materials were noted. Surface temperature data were analyzed to assess the potential of the avionics box serving as an overheat source to surrounding temperature-sensitive equipment (such as items with Li-Ion batteries). The highest temperature obtained for any of the tests was 104 °C (220 °F), and it was only sustained for a couple of seconds before self-extinguishment occurred, after which temperatures quickly dropped. Since this short-lived high temperature was obtained with an unrealistically high 80-percent free volume resulting in a significantly higher quantity of oxygen available for combustion, these conditions are unlikely to occur in actual use conditions. Maximum temperatures obtained, coupled with short duration temperature increases, indicate an avionics box or similar fire containment box is not a likely overheat ignition source for nearby temperature sensitive equipment.
It should be noted that all of the testing and results presented here were performed for containment boxes without forced air convection. These data should not be applied to units containing forced air convection. Additional testing would need to be performed to assess flammability risks of similar systems with the use of forced air convection. 
